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Economic justification of patents and exceptions to patentability 
Ana Nordberg 
Abstract: 
The present article is the conclusion of a review of economic justifications for patent rights 
conducted with the objective of determining whether such arguments are per se capable of 
sustaining the existence of a different patentability regime for inventions of methods for 
treatment and diagnostic methods (art.53 (c) European Patent Convention). It starts by 
exploring the normative background and summarily describes the different types of claims 
allowed under the current legal framework and their differences. The following sections will 
apply the principal economic argumentations to inventions of methods for treatment and 
diagnostic methods, confront those reasoning with contra-arguments and end with the 
formulation of conclusions extracted from the previous debate. 
 
Introduction: 
This article is the result of a review 1of the mainstream economic justifications for patent 
rights and addresses the question whether such economic arguments are per se capable of 
sustaining the existence of different patentability regimes applied on the one hand side to 
inventions of products and apparatus to be used on treatment and diagnostic and on the other 
                                                          
1 As background research for this article a literary survey of works addressing the economic justification of 
patents and patent scope was conducted. The works consulted include among others: Adam Smith, An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan, 5th ed. (Methuen & Co., Ltd 1904); 
Adam Smith, Lectures On Jurisprudence, ed. R.. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein, vol. V of the Glasgow 
Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Liberty Fund 1982); John Stuart Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. (William J. Ashley, ed. London; 
Longmans, Green and Co. 1909); Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (William Tait 1838-1843), Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of 
economic development, transl. Redvers Opie (Harvard University 1943); Kenneth Arrow, ‘Economic welfare 
and the allocations of resources for invention’, (1962) Rate and Direction of inventive activity 609; Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,3d ed. (Harper 1975); Edmund W. Kitch, ‘The nature and 
function of the patent System’ (1977) 20 JL & Econ.; Donald G. McFetridge and Douglas A. Smith, ‘Patents, 
Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment’ (1980) 23 J.L. & Econ. 197; Frederic M Scherer Industrial 
market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed. (Houghton Mifflin, 1980); Robert P. Merges and Richard 
R. Nelson, ‘On the Complex economics of patent scope’ (1990) 90 Colombia Law Review 839; Mark F. Grady 
and Jay I. Alexander, ‘Patent Law and Rent Dissipation’, (1992) Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, 
Symposium on the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property 305-350; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law, 4th ed (Little, Brown and Company 1992); Samuel Oddi, ‘Un-Unified economic theories of patents – The 
not-quite-holy grail’ (1996) 71 Notre Dame law Review 267; Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS regime of 
patent rights (Kluwer Law International, 2002);Clarissa Long, ‘Patent Signals’, (2002) 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 
635; William M Landes and Richard A Posner The economic structure of intellectual Property law, (Harvard 
University Press 2003); Robert P. Merges Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011); 
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Addison-Wesley 2012). 
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hand side to inventions of methods for treatment and diagnostic methods. It will be sustained 
that economic analysis of the structure and justification of patent rights is not capable in itself 
of providing for convincing arguments for such difference in legal regime and thus, such 
arguments, if they do exist must be found elsewhere.  
Although it appears intuitive that the justification for the exception rests in ordre public or 
morality considerations2, reinforced by the growingly popular use of human right discourse 
concerning limitations to intellectual property rights,3 these ethical justifications are also 
questionable and should not be taken for granted. Thus the choice of this topic is imposed by 
the need to research into all the different considerations that can (or cannot) justify the current 
normative framework in Europe. 
 
1. Normative Background and its historical evolution 
The TRIPS agreement4 is currently the seminal international source of intellectual 
property law.5. Regarding patent rights art 27 TRIPS establishes the general rule that “patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology.” It does not contain exceptions to patentability. However art 27 (2) and (3) allow 
member states to establish two forms of exception: (1) norms that prevent the commercial 
exploitation of certain inventions considered necessary to protect ordre public or morality (art 
27 n. 2); (2) norms that restrict the patentability of either, plants and animals other than micro-
organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes (art 27 n.3 (b)), and diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals (art 27 n.3 (a)).  
The architecture of the provision mirrors the unsettled scholarly debate concerning the 
nature and ratio of these norms within the jurisdictions that contain them. According to TRIPS 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals are not 
                                                          
2 For background on such debate see Nordberg, A. “Nanotechnology patents in Europe and the exception from 
patent for methods for treatment and diagnostic methods” N I R., 3/2010, p. 224-238. 
3 See Nordberg, A Nanotechnology, Human Rights, Patent Law and the Global South: A brief overview, in 
“New Technologies and Human Rights: Challenges to regulation” Cunha, M, Andrade,N ,Lixinski, L and 
Lomba, P (eds.), Ashgate (forthcoming) 
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, contained in an Annex to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the Wold Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994 
5 Ratification of the TRIPS has been made condition for accession to the World Trade Organization. The WTO 
currently has 153 member states. 
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considered to be a form of ordre public or morality exception but an autonomous category. 
Also, important to bear in mind is that, although the TRIPS recognises and allows these 
exceptions, not only does it not consider them mandatory, but in fact it restricts the grounds 
for exceptions to patentability that member states can enact. 
The second most relevant source of international patent law in europe is the European 
Patent Convention (EPC)6. A multilateral treaty instituting the European Patent Organisation 
(EPO) and providing for an autonomous regional patent system that offers a uniform 
application procedure which enables applicants to seek simultaneously patent protection in up 
to 40 European jurisdictions.  
The EPC also establishes the general rule that “European patents shall be granted for any 
inventions, in all fields of technology”.7 Although a definition of invention is not provided 
for, this provision includes a list of subject matter that is not considered to subsume to the 
concept of invention. Under this rule, most methods, such as “schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers” are 
not considered to be inventions “as such”, requiring an additional element to confer them 
“technical character”, methods for treatment and diagnostic methods are no longer mentioned 
in this provision.8 It does follows that such subject matter is not excluded from patentable 
subject matter, but rather an exception to the general rule prescribing the patentability of all 
inventions in all fields of technology.  
Under the original version of the EPC methods for treatment and diagnostic were 
mentioned in art 52 (4) and considered an example of excluded subject-matter by lack of the 
substantive patentability requirement ‘industrial application’. Pursuant to the revision of the 
EPC in 2000, this norm is now inserted in art 53, a provision devoted to subject matter 
excluded form patentability for ordre public and morality reasons. Also, under its current 
formulation, the EPC does not preclude the patentability of products used in such methods, as 
the norm expressively recognizes the patentability of products (whether chemical compounds 
or apparatus), an even the patentability of new uses of such products. 
                                                          
6 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 1973 as revised by 
the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000. 
7 Art 52 (1) EPC. 
8 Before the 2000 revision, methods for treatment and diagnosis methods where considered to lack industrial 
application, although it was widely held that such was a legal fiction. 
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The European legislator could have chosen to exclude from patentability all medical and 
pharmaceutical inventions, or could have taken the option of excluding certain categories of 
inventions such as chemical compounds or method patents. Although the art 27 TRIPS 
precludes such option, at the time of the EPC drafting such venue was still possible. In fact, 
prior to the European patent convention several jurisdictions opted for excluding 
pharmaceutical products (medicines) or even chemical products altogether.9  
The existence of exceptions to patentability relating to medicine products, under several 
different formulations pre-dates both the EPC and the TRIPS agreement, and has longstanding 
presence in several jurisdictions10. However it should be noted that the exception from 
patentability of methods for treatment and diagnosis methods did not appear as such in legal 
texts before the European patent convention was signed. In fact, prior to the EPC the only 
European countries with the specific exclusion for methods for treatment mentioned as such 
in statutory provisions were Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania11.  
In this light, it appears somehow extraordinary that the EPC drafting committee 
considered this to be non contentious matter. During the meetings of the working party of the 
EPC while debating the need to insert or not a provision of such nature, it was noted that all 
the national laws of the participant states considered that methods for treatment and diagnostic 
methods were not patentable, and that none of the delegations had proposed to reverse such 
principle in European law12, as a result there was little debate on whether it should or not be 
part of the convention and why. The debate was instead directed to the legal systematization, 
as there were different perspectives concerning the ratio and legal classification of the 
prohibitive norm. This points out in the direction of the conclusion that the origin of such 
provision in the EPC streams more from long standing national legal tradition of the founding 
                                                          
9 Denmark, GB, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland excluded the 
patentability of pharmaceutical substances or medicines, in Katzaeov's manual and Directory on Industrial 
Property all Over the world", 7th ed. 1970, Cabinet Katzarov, Geneva, Switzerland. 
10 A. & E. Carpmael Patent Laws of the World (Clowes, 1885) quoted by Bentley, Lionel et al. ‘Exclusions from 
Patentability and Exceptions and Limitations to Patentees’ Rights’ (WIPO 2010), 16. 
11 Due to the practical impossibility of accessing all laws in force at the relevant historical moments, for this 
study were used several guides or directories of patent laws in translation, namely: Berthold Singer Patent and 
Trade Marks Laws of the World (Hammond Press 1911); Konstantin Katzaroff (ed) Katzaroff’s Patent directory: 
1931 (self edition,1931); Jan Vojáček A survey of the principal national patent systems (Pitman, 1936); 
Konstantin Katzaroff (ed) Katzaroff’s Patent directory (Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce 1957.; J.W. Baxter, 
World Patent Law and Practice (Sweet & Maxwel 1968); Katzaroff, 1970, n9;  Bentley et al, n8. 
12 Article 52F Travaux Préparatoires (CBE 1973) Resultats de la douziéme session du groupe de travail ''brevets'' 
qui se tenue à Bruzelle du 26 février au 6 mars 1964 Comptes Rendus, 2632/IV/64-F, 22. 
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members of the EPC, than any particular study or scientific reasoning. An additional 
explanation, may reside in the fact that such methods were not considered generally as 
pertaining to an industrial activity. Traditionally, the medical profession has been considered 
to be outside the scope of commercial law, being regulated by corporative rules and codes of 
ethics. The medical profession does not consider itself driven by commercial logic and 
medical professionals are not allowed to orientate their professional conduct by profit 
motivations.13. 
 
2. Types of claims allowed under the European Patent Convention 
The rules in force prescribe that patents are available for all inventions either products or 
processes.14 Claims for products encompass both apparatus or mechanical inventions and 
products stritus sensus such as chemical compositions. A method is a type of process. In a 
purely literal definition, a methods is ‘’a particular way of doing something’’,15 thus it implies 
that a method for treatment by therapy or surgery or a method of diagnosis is a certain 
particular way or manner of treating or diagnosing a certain condition. 
The EPC does not contain a definition of method for treatment and diagnostic methods. 
Considering the EPO jurisprudence it can be concluded that a method claim is any description 
of a process that has the purpose of either making a diagnosis for curative purposes or has 
curative purposes, as opposed to a claim of a method whose purpose is to obtain a product. 
The method will only fall under the exclusion if it includes interaction with the human or 
animal body. Neither the nature of the interaction, its intensity, nor the professional 
qualification of the person who is to perform the method are consequential.16 
The EPC recognizes the patentability of first, second and further medical indications of 
known substances. Furthermore this legal understanding has evolved into accepting the 
patentability of dosage regimes. Dosage regimes patents distinguish themselves from the 
known state of the art by inventing a previously unknown second or further use of a known 
substance, being that such new use resides merely in quantitative terms. In such patents, the 
                                                          
13 “A Physician shall not allow his/her judgment to be influenced by personal profit or unfair discrimination 
”World Medical Association International Code of Medical Ethics, Adopted by the 3rd General Assembly of the 
World Medical Association, London, England, October 1949 , para 3.  
14 Art 27 TRIPS (4). 
15 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus, Cambridge University Press, available at 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/, viewed April 2012. 
16 See for all G1/04 diagnostic methods Official Journal EPO 334 2006. 
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claims are not directed to the invention of a certain substance (product), nor to a process of 
obtaining a substance, but rather to a process of obtaining a therapeutic result.17  
 
3. Economic justification of art 53 (c) EPC 
Mainstream scholars that have theorized about the economic justifications for patent rights 
rarely address the subject of how their theoretical constructions can be reconciled with the 
existence of exceptions to patentability. In the following section different economic 
arguments for patent protection will be applied to the exception from patentable inventions for 
methods for treatment and diagnostic methods. Since exceptions can be understood as either 
mere qualification of the norm or as having autonomous rationale, the section will be divided 
accordingly. 
 
3.1. Exceptions as qualification of the norm justified by the rule of free market 
Exceptions can be understood as the qualification of the norm, following the reasoning that if 
inventions are public goods, introducing means to private appropriation by scarcity creation is 
in itself the exception to the rule. Thus, any rule that restricts the grant of such rights is a mere 
qualification that re-instates the general principle and rules that condition the functioning of 
the market. 
This line of argumentation implies an understanding of patent rights as artificially 
created monopolies, and the assumption that a free market operating under perfect 
competition circumstances is preferable to monopolist or oligopolistic. However, a flaw to 
this reasoning is that patents are mere entitlements and do not necessarily create monopoly 
situations. Monopolies will only emerge in the absence of substitute products. Furthermore, 
such view does not encompass situations were patents are not used in there traditional sense to 
manufacture and introduce a product in the market.18  
If we understand exceptions as a qualification of the norm, then the reverse argument for 
justifying the existence of patent rights should validate the existence of exceptions, meaning 
that exceptions necessarily have to be justified by the absence of a market failure. Under this 
reasoning, exception would only make sense if the market mechanisms are deemed to provide 
                                                          
17 G2/08 Dosage regime Official Journal EPO 456 2010 
18 Several studies have concluded that the majority of patents are not explored by the patent owners to introduce 
a product on the market, and often are not explored at all. See Long, n1, 635. 
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enough incentive as to the production of the optimal level of new methods for treatment and 
diagnostic methods. 
It postulates that the justification for the exception is the general rules that dictate the 
functioning of a perfect competition market. There is not a sub optimal level of innovation 
since lead time and demand/offer mechanisms function as incentives. This line of justification 
is the main argument of patent opponents and if true it should be true to all inventions. 
Assuming that in patent rights are needs in order to foster investment in the production of new 
inventions, this economic reverse argumentation could only justify exclusions if a 
fundamental difference is found between these inventions and the inventions patentable. 
Products used in medical treatment and diagnosis, either apparatus or chemical compounds 
are expressly not included on the exclusion. Meaning that in order for this argument to be 
persuasive, a fundamental difference between these methods and other inventions must exist. 
Methods are essentially processes, a number of steps that allow a certain result to be obtained. 
The fundamental difference between a process and product patent is exhaustion, meaning that 
in a process patent the right is not exhausted when put on the market. Thus, since patents 
protects against independent creation a method patent can impose a limit on a human activity. 
However, not all process patents are excluded from patentability. Art 53 (c) EPC does not 
exclude processes to obtain products used in methods for treatment or in diagnostic methods. 
Furthermore, first and further medical uses of a known substance are also patentable19. The 
provision only excludes from patentability methods performed on the human body for 
therapeutic or diagnostic purposes. It could thus be sustained that the determinant 
differentiating factor is the fact that patentability of these methods equal the imposition of a 
limitation on a human activity performed on the human or animal body for treatment or 
diagnostic purposes. However, this argument shifts the debate to the field of exercise and 
enforcement of rights. If any this reasoning would justify the imposition of restriction to the 
use of the patent right but it does not justify its inexistence.  
The differences between products, traditional processes and method claims do not sustain 
arguments for differential treatment from an economic perspective. On the contrary, according 
to the arrows information paradox20 since the invention of a method is both easier to copy and 
                                                          
19 Art 54 (4) (5) EPC 
20 Arrow n1, 609 
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easier to keep secret than other types of invention then the need for legal protection is greater. 
Furthermore, this view of exceptions as mere qualification of the norm although compatible 
with classical justification of patents, such as the reward theory and early incentive theories, 
does not encompass a notion of the function of the patent system as providing incentive to 
innovation, understood as a process. 
 
3.2 Exceptions as autonomous norms  
Exceptions to the general norm of patent availability have a restrictive field of application and 
follow a reasoning that is different from the general considerations that justify the main norm. 
Understanding exceptions as autonomous norms may entail not only the danger of interpreting 
the norm beyond its intended reach but also of losing a systematic perspective leading to the 
application of different logic to similar realities and thus introducing disruptive elements into 
the system. However, understanding exclusions as autonomous norms, eradicates the need to 
justify the exception by using the reverse argument that imposes the general rule sustaining 
the absence of the conditions that determine the justification of the general norm and allows 
autonomous justification. While patents as a legal institute have been for a long time justified 
by economic reasoning, exceptions has autonomous norms so far have been mostly justified 
based on specific private moral reasoning. However, it is still possible to search for 
autonomous rational for exceptions outside the field of ethical considerations. 
 
3.2.1 Absence of market failure 
If we take into consideration that exceptions are for the most part considered justified by 
moral reasoning, then in economic terms it is possible to sustain that the exception exists 
because the subject-matter considered are not economic goods, but rather ‘bads’, or 
something that the society does not want to be produced or will commit resources to dispose 
off. Pursuant to this reasoning there is no need to provide for incentive to innovation in order 
to correct a market failure where such market failure does not exist. If any, there is a need to 
disincentive the allocation of societal resources to the production of ‘bads’ (non-ethical 
conforming inventions) and provide incentive to the production of goods (innovation in 
ethical conforming inventions).  
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The ‘general’ exception to patent grant of art 53 (a) has a pure ethical ratio legis: these 
are subject matter whose commercialization violates the core values and ethical principles of 
our civilization. 
A patent is a mere administrative concession of a right to exclude third parties from 
exploring the invention, not a regulatory authorization to market a product. In this sense the 
grant of a patent per se is not susceptible of violating any ethical values, it is the commercial 
exploitation of the patent that may or not have such effect. The EPC legislator chose to ignore 
the possibility of addressing the subject in regulatory framework, and chose to make the grant 
of patents conditional on the observance of the concept of human dignity in the 
commercialization phase. One possible argument is that the grant of a patent creates on the 
patent holder the legal expectation of being able to explore the invention commercially, and 
that the grant of a patent may appear to be on the eyes of the public as a sign of administrative 
endorsement of such non-ethical conforming inventions. 
Still, despite of being based on ethical considerations, it is possible to justify the 
exclusion form patentability of subject-matter encompassed in 53 (a) EPC based on the fact 
that such subject matter is not an economic good, an item destined to satisfy a societal need.21. 
However, concerning methods for treatment and diagnostic methods such considerations do 
not apply, since it is difficult to sustain that the normal commercialization of a treatment of 
diagnostic method would per se violate ethical principles.22 It could be argued that the 
commercialization of health care is unethical since health is a basic human right founded in a 
notion of dignity of the human life. Such would be a valid argument in a global system that 
provided universal medical care and pharmaceutical products for free, and where all stages of 
the medical innovation process were conducted directly by public or state subsidised 
institutions and completely subtracted from the logic of a free market economy. However 
such reasoning does not apply in a market economy where medical and pharmaceutical 
innovation is privately funded and products used on medical treatment are market goods.  
Another recurrent argument is linked with the nature of the medical profession. 
Traditionally the medical profession has not been considered a commercial or industrial 
activity, and medical acts are not acts of commerce. It is argued that the medical profession 
                                                          
21 This notion does not preclude the existence of demand for such detrimental or unethical products or services.  
22 Absent any specific circumstances of exclusionary abuse that should be subject to competition rules. 
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does not follow market logic of profit and prices are not governed by offer and demand 
considerations, since the medical profession, although not barred from making a living from 
medicine practice, should have as higher objective the interest of the patients.  
The ethical rules that guide the medical profession are irrelevant; a non profit activity is 
not synonym of non economic. Law and economics scholars have since long proved that any 
human activity can be studied by in economic theory even non commercial activities can be 
submitted to a cost/benefit analysis and obey to the supply/demand paradigm.  
While there might be other ethical arguments capable of sustaining the exception, those are 
not capable of transforming from an economic view point these inventions into unwanted 
goods or ‘bads’. Neither the distinction between process or product patents and its 
implications dictates the validity of the argument that denies the economic incentive provided 
by the grant of patents to unwanted or non-useful goods. 
 
3.2.2 There is a market failure corrected by alternative forms of incentive 
The main justification for patent rights existence is derived from being the optimal mean to 
correct a market failure. We need to consider if there is a market failure in the case of methods 
for treatment and diagnostic methods. 
If the theory is correct it should be valid to all inventions: products and processes. A 
method, in its essence can be qualified has a type of process – a way to achieve a result. 
However methods differ from other processes since the result is not a physical but rather an 
immaterial product: restoration of health or detection of a certain health condition. 
On general terms, the patentability of processes collides with the difficulty of 
considering them to be an invention. Ideas and scientific theories are not inventions. Methods 
are a sequence of pre-established steps, and mental steps or ideas can not be patentable as 
such. However, a well determined sequence of steps of a technical nature can be patentable, 
since it is no longer considered to fall under the concept of non-invention of art 52 EPC. 
A recurrent argument is that incentive for innovation concerning methods for treatment 
and diagnostic methods provided by patents is not necessary, since such incentive is provided 
by alternatives means, i.e. a system relying on other forms of incentive that include research 
grants, career progress, public recognition, good will for the hospital/practitioners involved, a 
perceived ethical duty of sharing knowledge and other similar non-monetary incentives. It 
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remains to be determined if such system provides for a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Answering this question with empiric data does not appear to be a feasible task. While 
innovation has not ceased in Europe in the absence of patents it is impossible to compare the 
actual level of innovation with an eventual level of innovation should patents for these 
inventions had been available. Furthermore, a comparison with the EUA where method patent 
are issued, would not provide useful empirical data. Not only the innovation processes is not 
fully known and has many determinant concurring factors, but also any conclusions would be 
tainted by the fact that once patented the information is public and the invention can be 
practiced in Europe without any restrictions. 
The mere argument, above, necessarily implies that the need for incentive to innovation, 
as to correct a market failure does exist in the medical sector. However, such argument states 
that inventors of methods for treatment and diagnostic methods respond primarily to 
alternative incentives, rather than to patents. Such might be true if we use a justification for 
patents based on reward/incentive to invent paradigm. Under such justification, inventions are 
typically produced during the normal course of the medical activity in the attempt to improve 
existing methods, and thus other mechanisms of incentive/reward such as professional 
recognition are enough to provide society with the optimal level of inventions. Furthermore, 
resort to trade secret is precluded since medical practitioners are bound by the deontological 
obligation of sharing knowledge with other medical professionals.23 Thus patents are not 
needed either as incentive/reward to disclosure.  
However, currently it is doubtful that inventions of methods of treatment or diagnostic 
are the product of research conducted mainly by medical professionals. The link between the 
medical practitioner and these inventions is becoming thinner as technology evolves. The 
mere qualification of an invention as treatment or diagnostic applied on the human body is 
problematic. Under current practice of the EPO the qualification of a method invention as 
treatment or diagnosis does not rely on the qualification of the person who performs it.24 
Likewise the application of the exclusion is completely independent of the characterization of 
the inventor or patent applicant. The patent applicant can be and often is a commercial 
                                                          
23 References to the Hippocratic oat and the norm of sharing medical knowledge adopted by the America 
Medical association code of ethics are common in literature. However, it should be noted that a similar rule is not 
found explicitly in the World Medical Association International Code of Medical Ethics. 
24 G1/04 diagnostic methods Official Journal EPO 334 2006; G1/07 medi-physics Official Journal EPO 130 
2011? 
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company or a privately funded research institution, instead of an individual. Even when the 
inventor(s) are simultaneously the patent applicant(s), they are not necessarily medical 
practitioner(s). In the case of the most advanced technologies such as nanomedicine, research 
is done typically by teams of scientists with multidisciplinary scientific backgrounds. Medical 
diagnosis and treatment research is no longer necessarily conducted by medical practitioners 
in the curse of their practice. 
In conclusion, if we move beyond the classical notion of invention and the reward/ 
incentive to invent arguments for patent protection, and use the notion of innovation the 
necessary conclusion is that those alternative forms of incentive only operate for inventions 
resulting from personal medical practice and not inventions created and developed into market 
product in complex industrial settings. 
 
3.2.3 Patent rights as (not) necessary conditions to induce investment in innovation in 
methods for treatment and diagnosis 
As a rule companies will invest in research that may lead to products or services that can be 
marketed in conditions as to recovers their opportunity costs (either by using patents or trade 
secrets to do so). Inventions that either can be market under trade secret, or are accidental 
inventions that require small investment and have a high benefit-cost ratio will not be induced 
by the patent system,25 and thus the patent system is not a necessary condition to their 
existence. 
Some of the arguments for denying patentability for methods rest on the notion that 
typically methods are accidental inventions or by-products of the medical practice. However, 
even in the absence of definitive empirical data such does not appear compatible with the 
complexity of contemporaneous medicine. Furthermore, most inventions in the medical sector 
tend to fall into what the patent-induced theory would classify as revolutionary26, due to the 
nature of the field and the need to satisfy strict regulatory constraints. Once a medical 
invention is available in the market all it needs is to have a therapeutic advantage to render all 
other options redundant. After all a physician is barred by professional deontological rules 
from prescribing a therapeutically inferior product or use a less efficient method for treatment 
                                                          
25 Scherer n1, 443- 450 and Oddi n1, 278 
26 Revolutionary inventions are those that produce a “spectacular technical contribution” and are patent induced. 
Scherer, n1 443 
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or diagnostic. Resort to outdated or less efficient treatments will only be acceptable in case of 
unavailability of such resources. 
A contra argument could be raised, by arguing that innovation has not cease in the 
absence of these methods patents in Europe. However, such argument would be overthrown 
by the evolution of medicine. Until recently, it could have been sustained that there was a 
clear distinguishing between methods and product inventions, and methods were either 
accidental inventions or developed in public research entities, such as hospitals and 
universities in a setting were the incentive provided by patents was not determinant. 
 
3.2.4 Patents as prospects 
According to the prospect theory the function of the patent system is defined as a means to 
provide reward for investment in the development of a technological prospect after the patent 
has been granted. The prospect is defined as ”a particular opportunity to develop a known 
technological possibility”27.Under this vision of the patent system, the patentability of 
methods for treatment is justified, even for those that may be accidental inventions. If we 
accept that patent rights function as an incentive to prospect or to develop the invention, then 
arguments such as the existence of other forms of incentive related with the medical 
professional would be completely void. Even if we accept that inventions can be supplied 
without the need of patent rights incentive, the same can not be said for ulterior phases of the 
innovation process.  
 
3.2.5 Market signals 
Patents, as other IP rights, are currently understood by the different markets agents (investors, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, decision makers, opinion makers and consumers) as signalling a 
complexity of characteristics and functions. A patent today, as evolved into a signal of 
potential for further technological development, an investment security, a business asset, a 
basic commodity for downstream industries, a guarantee of quality, exclusivity and originality 
to the consumer. 
Although the patent rights were not created in order to convey information about the 
invention beyond the disclosure of technical information, currently ownership of patents 
                                                          
27 Kitch n1, 266. 
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transmits a variety of signals to the market and has become to venture investors an important 
element in assessing opportunity costs in the decision making process. Patents have become a 
form of meter other not so readily accessible attributes of companies.28 Additionally, patents 
convey information to consumers and are seen as a sign of prestige, a guarantee that the good 
is innovative, and a token of quality and safety.29  
Understanding patents not only as incentive/reward providers, but has holding an 
additional signalling function whether as “as means of credible publicizing information”30 or 
as an accurate manner of metering inventions,31 implies questioning whether such function 
would exist or not in the case of medical methods and whether the availability of this 
signalling function is more efficiently achieve by patents or by alternative means. 
The signalling function operates independently of the type of claim, and thus it would 
provide an additional tool of dissemination of information regarding novel methods for 
treatment and diagnostic methods. Furthermore, patent right holders have incentive and tend 
to invest considerably in reinforcing the information function with marketing efforts directed 
to specially targeted audiences. Traditional alternative forms of incentive/reward require an 
individual effort in obtaining information and thus are less efficient. Furthermore, a race to 
publish, compared with a race to patent produces more incentive to publication of early 
research results than to publish better researched subject, undermining the information 
function. 
 
3.2.6 Rent dissipation 
Although rent dissipation theory, as proposed by Grady and Alexander has been justly 
criticised32 and is not intended to be a patent justification theory, its basic premises can be 
used to assert the justification of exclusions to patentability. According to the rent dissipation 
theory any subject matter, even those falling under art 52 and 53 EPC could be patentable. 
Discoveries and scientific theories could be patentable since they often open a race for finding 
the first patentable invention or what Grady and Alexander call improvements.  
                                                          
28 Long n1, 646. 
29 Such holds true even if such information is an illusion at best. A patent does not guarantee that an invention is 
a preferable technical solution, but it does attest that it’s a new solution, and it works as claimed. 
30 Long n1, 625. 
31 Carvalho n1, 1. 
32 Landes and Posnes n1, 352. 
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Similar reasoning can be applied to exceptions to patentability including methods for 
treatment and diagnostic methods applied to the animal or human body. Even if it is accepted 
the argument that incentive for the invention is provided not by the availability of patent 
rights but by alternative means (e.g. research grants, prestige, sense of duty). Alternative 
means of incentive also have an economic cost, and races to be the first to publish and be 
credit for scientific achievement also produce rent dissipation.  
Medical methods are clearly inventions whose signalling potential is enormous. Survival 
is the most basic instinct; there is nothing more valuable than health and nothing more 
prestigious than finding a new method of treatment. With the exception of a few cases of self 
contained prefect solutions, any new method would trigger a race for improvement, leading to 
rent dissipation. In this sense the grant of patents for methods for treatment would be justified 
by the need to limit rent dissipation in post-grant phases. Patents are more efficient in 
preventing rent dissipation than the incentive and reward provided by research grants and 
moral and reputation related rewards due to the fact that patents are granted to one applicant 
only and in a processes conducted by one single entity – the relevant patent office. Research 
grants and other incentives potentially can be simultaneously provided by an unlimited 
number of entities to a considerable number of researchers. 
 
3.2.7 Race to invent  
Opponents of broad patent scope, such as Merges and Nelson claim that empirical evidence 
proves that coordinated development by a single entity is less efficient than open 
competition.33 Thus, the patent system should provide incentive to induce a race-to-invent by 
narrowing the scope of pioneer patents. Arguably, this reasoning provides arguments that 
impose stricter application of exclusions and exceptions to patentability. Regarding the 
methods exception it should be said that this understanding can be extended to alternative 
means of incentive/reward. A race to invent is a race to reap a reward, monetary or not it can 
always be measured in economic terms. Likewise it is of little consequence if such race is 
fuelled either by a race to patent or a race to publish: human behaviour dictates that the 
economic man innovates to seek a competitive advantage (even if such advantage is the sense 
of fulfilling a mere moral command of contributing to progress and the good of mankind). In 
                                                          
33 Merges and Nelson n1 
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this sense, Merges and Nelson conclusion that competition fosters innovation is not 
contradicted. However, restricting incentive to pioneer inventions overlooks the fact that such 
would decrease incentive to disclosure information, since postponing patentability to a more 
mature phase of the innovation process would delay even more the publication of knowledge. 
Also reducing incentives to basic research corresponds to investment swift from basic 
research to product development, and such can have unwanted overall social effects.  
 
Conclusion: 
Economic reasoning applied to the art 53 (c) EPC does not provide convincing arguments for 
the justification of the exclusion from patentability of methods for treatment and diagnostic 
methods applied on the human or animal body. In fact, this exercise shows that this exception 
to patent protection not only is not compatible with currently known economic justifications 
of patent rights, but in fact economic reasoning applied to art 53 (c) appears to reinforce the 
general principle that patents should be available for any inventions, either processes or 
products. The absence of an economic justification for this exception leads to the following 
logic conclusions. Firstly, if economic justifications are not able to explain the existence of 
this exception, then economic reasoning can not be used as the sole framework for 
justification of patent rights but rather as an approach that needs to be complemented by the 
use of other methodologies of analysis. Secondly, in the absence of economic justifications 
the existence of the provision must be justified by other considerations, namely ethical 
arguments such as protection of public accessibility to state of the art health care and of the 
professional freedom of medical practitioners. Thirdly, if either such ethical justifications 
were also to be found flawed in particular when confronted with the latest scientific and 
technical developments in emerging technologies or were found unable to promote the 
attainability of the values it intends to protect, then there is room for further research and 
debate concerning possible alternative legislative options. 
